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POTENTIAL FOR DEGROWTH: ATTITUDES AND 
BEHAVIOURS ACROSS 18 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
Abstract. Avoiding a whole-scale collapse of the civili-
sation-supporting ecosystems within this century will 
require a change in the social metabolism, as well as 
expectations, aspirations, behaviours and attitudes of 
the majority of the global population, especially in the 
Global North. In absence of the technological innova-
tion to allow maintenance and expansion of the cur-
rent energy utilisation by the global society, but with-
out the collapse-inducing byproducts, the societies will 
require a transformation along the lines of a degrowth 
scenario. The main goal of this paper is to explore to 
what extent is environmentally motivated degrowth 
potential present among European populations on the 
level of attitudes and evaluation of behaviour. In order 
to do so we use the ISSP research module Environment 
survey data from 2011, analysing comparative find-
ings for 18 European ‘old’ and ‘new’ democracies. Our 
findings indicate the prevalence of common awareness 
of environmental limits to growth among all partici-
pating European national populations, but a different 
potential to apply them in a degrowth scenario between 
‘richer’ and ‘poorer’ states, as well as between younger 
and older European degrowthers. 
Keywords: degrowth, environmental limits, sustainabil-
ity, social transformation, Europe, ISSP
Introduction
“Indeed, these three fundamental questions of economic organization – 
what, how, and for whom – are as crucial today as they were at the dawn of 
human civilization.” (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1998: 8)
* Dr. Sc. Branko Ančić, postdoctoral fellow; dr. Mladen Domazet, research associate, Institute for 
Social Research in Zagreb, Croatia.
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In the run-up to another global regulatory struggle concerned with 
climate-wrecking economic ‘side-effect’ at the Paris 2015 COP, the debate 
about the environmental consequences of international economic growth 
and associated material consumption have gained academic and policy 
prominence again. The global strategy response has so far been twofold. 
One strategy response is to call for a rapid and radical transition to a “green 
economy” intensely decoupled from material use and carbon emissions in 
energy production (UNEP, 2011). The other one is to completely change 
focus away from economic growth as the societal developmental goal with 
globally destructive consequences (Dietz & O’Neill, 2013; Jackson, 2009; 
Kallis, 2011). 
Whilst the former strategy would also require a social transition tradi-
tionally associated with a major technological change (in energy production 
and distribution, for example) (Park, 1954; Polany, 1968; Pomeranz, 2009) it 
is currently primarily a problem of missing sufficiently implementable tech-
nological innovation (Steinberger, Krausmann, Getzner, Schandl & West, 
2013; Tienhaara, 2009). But should it ever materialise, it promises to require 
a lesser upheaval to the social structures through which the embodied solar 
energy is distributed and the governance mechanisms altering their dynam-
ics, than is the case with modification of social and governance structures 
to lessen the environmental impact of the current technology (Domazet et 
al., 2014). For much of the world population it is more akin to a business as 
usual scenario that requires no fundamental societal transformation. 
The latter, the approach broadly characterised as degrowth (Schneider, 
2008, 2010), involves a technological change as well. The current energy 
transformation technologies are clearly unsustainable given the sustenance-
threatening consequences of dramatic climate change induced by the end 
of the century through the business-as-usual path of fossil fuel utilisation by 
a growing global population. A global population would have to dramati-
cally reduce the use of existing fossil-fuel energy, increase the efficiency 
of those it cannot avoid utilising and replace them with renewable energy 
sources wherever possible (Jackson, 2009). Such a transition is associated 
with a much more radical social transformation for it decouples social and 
personal development and improvement aspirations from increase in eco-
nomic production and consumption (material or ‘dematerialized’) within a 
given population. In simpler terms, it asks of the population to be prepared 
to do with less in terms of energy and material products.
Regarding social transformation it is significant how new concepts, 
ideas, paradigm shifts and social movements tackling these issues emerge in 
contemporary societies. For instance, in 2014 in Leipzig, Germany, Fourth 
International Conference on Degrowth for Ecological Sustainability and 
Social Equity has gathered various social actors (academicians and activists) 
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around the topic of degrowth and reflecting upon concrete steps towards 
sustainable societies beyond the imperative of growth1. Previously, activ-
ist and research communities have tackled the impact of degrowth and 
various degrowth scenarios at international conferences such as Paris in 
2008, Barcelona in 2010 and Montreal and Venice in 2012, but also within 
the civil society organizations and initiatives in Canada, Spain, Greece or 
France (Baykan, 2007). We could say that in recent years a rising number of 
engaged social actors began to form a sort of social coalition dealing with 
implementation of degrowth transition, underlined by democratic proc-
esses calling for “downscaling the economy and bringing it within ecologi-
cal limits” (Cattaneo, D’Alisa, Kallis & Zografos, 2012).
Contemporary societies, perceived either as industrial or post-industrial, 
are characterized with processes of marketization and economization of 
non-economic societal systems (i.e. welfare, healthcare, arts, education, civil 
society etc.). Economization became the main principle of societalization 
while at the heart of this principle lays the imperative of growth. Therefore, 
degrowth implies a change of the concept of the economy of growth but 
not only in terms of a GDP decline. It implies a change in nature of pro-
duction and consumption, aiming at social and environmental sustainabil-
ity (Demaria, Schneider, Sekulova & Martinez-Alier, 2013). Low or negative 
rates of GDP change in fact privilege inherited wealth worsening existing 
social inequalities in the long run, which in turn act as a barrier to demo-
cratic support for environmentally sustainable strategies (Piketty, 2014; 
Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010; Žitko, 2014). Degrowth should not be seen as a 
solely economic concept but more as a social concept with multi-contextual 
and multi-dimensional layers, since it incorporates activism and research in 
justice, critical analysis of development’s relation to utilitarianism, wellbe-
ing, reformism and radical alternative practices. It encompasses topics of 
our past and our future in terms of our everyday life practices and poten-
tials. 
Social transformation and shift towards non-growth oriented societies 
assumes, as the degrowth theoreticians an activists underlay (Cattaneo et 
al., 2012), achievement of a degrowth scenario as the widening and deep-
ening of the process of democratization, thus leading to social emancipa-
tion. Social changes unfolding in either more revolutionary or evolutionary 
social dynamics, but holding within the frames of widening and deepening 
of the process of democratization, depends on the existence and formation 
of specific value orientations. For restructuring social relations in order to 
make a shift towards degrowth orientation certain inter-dependent princi-
ples, as Latouche argues, are required. His “Rs” of degrowth include eight 
1 http://leipzig.degrowth.org/en/ 
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inter-dependent principles. Re-evaluate what matters. Reconceptualize key 
notions such as wealth, poverty, value, scarcity and abundance. Restructure 
the productive apparatus and social relations to fit these new values. Redis-
tribute wealth and access to natural resources between North and South 
and between classes, generations and individuals. Relocalize which means 
producing on local level thus descending all economic, political and cul-
tural decisions at that level. Reduce production and consumption, especially 
for goods and services with little use value but high environmental impact. 
Re-use products and Recycle waste (Latouche, 2009). 
Latouche’s degrowth principles are broad social concepts needed for 
thinking in terms of social transformation towards sustainable and equi-
table societies, but one principle needs to be mentioned as a widening of 
Latouche’s degrowth principles and that is social trust. For social emancipa-
tion through democratically based social transformation, social trust seems 
to be a necessary social prerequisite, especially in terms of relocalizing 
social practices and decision-making. Emancipatory potential of (‘devel-
oped’) societies to make a u-turn for reduction of economic production and 
consumption, thus leading to achievement of degrowth scenarios, can be 
explored through analyzing the prevalence of attitudes and practices con-
nected with Latouche’s degrowth inter-dependent principles. All of these 
inter-dependent principles as social concepts have an axiological notion 
immanent not only for philosophical dimension of degrowth concept, 
but also as socially existent ideas at individual level. The main goal of this 
paper is to explore to what extent are some of the Latouche’s degrowth “Rs” 
present among European populations on the level of attitudes and evalu-
ation of behavior. In order to do so we use the International Social Survey 
Programme research module Environment which focuses on environmen-
tal attitudes, beliefs and behavior. 
Methodology 
For the purpose of exploring the degrowth potential in Europe we use 
the data for 18 countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) partici-
pating in the ISSP module Environment, and fielded during 2009, 2010 and 
20112. As degrowth measures we have used several indicators assessing 
value orientation and intended behavior concerning degrowth concept, 
and in the analysis will be used as dependent variables.
2 ISSP Research Group (2012): International Social Survey Programme: Environment III – ISSP 
2010. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5500 Data file Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11418
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Dependent variables
As degrowth indicators we have used ISSP variables presenting personal 
willingness to make a material sacrifice in order to protect the environment, 
assessment of personal behaviour in line with mentioned degrowth princi-
ples and attitudes on economic growth-environment trade-off (table 1). 
Composite measure Attitudes of Material Sacrifice (AMS) includes meas-
ures of willingness to: a) pay much higher prices in order to protect the 
environment; b) pay much higher taxes in order to protect the environ-
ment; c) to accept cuts in one’s own standard of living in order to protect 
the environment3. It is thus a direct expression of the diffusion within a 
particular state’s population of individuals willing to make sacrifices and 
support policies that demand greater material investments from individuals 
whilst providing smaller material benefits for them from resource extrac-
tion. The latter is what is required for reduction of the ecological footprint 
of individual societies, and the overall global population in the end, in order 
to bring them in line with the projected sustainable state.
Degrowth-compliant pro-environmental behaviour (DCPEB) is pre-
sented by a set of variables that, rather than measuring actual behaviour, 
measures respondents’ intentions to take part in pro-environmental behav-
iour environment, such as recycling of glass, plastic and paper, buying 
‘green’ products, saving water and choosing alternative means of transpor-
tation instead of travelling by car or saving energy. This indicator presents 
evaluation of personal behaviour and effort in line with degrowth orienta-
tion.
On top of indexes, composite measures of willingness for material sac-
rifice and personal efforts for environmental reasons, we also use single 
variable indicators of agreement/disagreement with general statements 
concerning economic growth-environment trade-off. These report on the 
prevalence within individual states of individuals who agree or disagree 
with statements whose affirmation or denial is a lemma of ecological and 
democratic strands of the degrowth conceptualisation. We divide these state-
ments into those that express awareness of the immediate trade-off between 
growth as we know it and environmental protection, and those that express 
awareness of general ecological limits of growth, and name them Active 
Degrowth and Passive Degrowth respectively. The items were measured on 
a Likert-type acceptance scale ranging from 1 = “strongly agree”; 2=”agree”; 
3= “neither agree nor disagree”; 4=”disagree”; 5 = “strongly disagree”. Active 
Degrowth is represented by two single-variable (attitude) indicators (10a 
3 Reliability analysis on these three items for all of the ISSP countries indicates a good internal consist-
ency (Cronbach’s α is 0.84). Therefore, we have constructed an additive index ranging from 3 to 15.
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and 11a). The first, concurrent with Environment-economy trade-off indica-
tor in Domazet et al. (2014a), exhibits the prevalence of individuals within 
states’ populations who disagree with statement that concern for the future 
of the environment is exaggerated and unjustifiably prioritised over eco-
nomic activities and progress. This is linked to considerations of efficacy on 
the individual and collective levels, perceptions of which are vital to one’s 
willingness to make degrowth commitments concerning economic activity 
(Meyer, 2010; Ostrom, 2010). The second single-variable (attitude) indica-
tor (11a) measures the normative side of economy-environment trade-off. It 
captures the prevalence within state’s populations of individuals who disa-
gree with a single item statement that their country needs economic growth 
in order to protect the environment. Whilst these variables do not in and 
of themselves indicate prevalence of support for full-blown economic and 
social degrowth transformations (Demaria et al., 2013; Kallis, 2011), they do 
indicate general conceptual support for a shift away from the developmen-
tal paradigm by which economic growth leads to remedying of individual 
scarcity and national environmental problems. 
Passive Degrowth is represented by two single-variable (attitude) indica-
tors (11b and 19c). The first captures the prevalence within national popula-
tions of individuals who agree with a single item statement that economic 
growth always harms the environment. Such agreement does not signal that 
in the growth-environment trade-off the environment should be favoured, 
but expresses an awareness that such a trade-off exists and thus might indi-
cate abandonment of hope in ‘green economies’ that would successfully 
and rapidly decouple economic growth from environmental impact. Whilst 
less important to efficacy of action, this awareness nonetheless presents 
a fertile ethical foundation to consider future development strategies that 
would aim to balance ecological concerns with democratic material aspira-
tions. The second is even more explicit in the expression of limits to growth 
awareness; it reports on percentage of individuals within national popula-
tions expressing agreement with a statement that economic progress in their 
country will slow down unless better environmental protection is enacted. 
This is an explicit expression of awareness that environmental limits of 
growth have been reached, and that further economic progress (though 
explicitly, term growth is not used in this variable) depends on protection 
rather than destruction of the environmental conditions. This awareness, 
again, can be perceived as a warning but not an expression of taking sides 
in environment-growth trade-off, as different environmental protection 
strategies may still be seen to be compatible with or resultant from focus on 
achieving economic growth. 
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Table 1:  INDExES AND INDICATORS Of DEGROwTh ATTITuDES AND 
BEhAVIORS
INDEXES ITEMS
Attitudes of material sacrifice 
index (AMS) 
“how willing would you be to:”a
the reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s 
alpha) for 18 countries is 0.853
(a) “pay much higher prices in order to 
protect the environment”
0.56 – 0.80 inter-item correlation
(b) “pay much higher taxes in order to 
protect the environment”
(c) “to accept cuts in your standard of living 
in order to protect the environment“
Degrowth-compliant pro-
environmental behaviour (DCPEB)
“how often do you make a special effort 
to…”b
the reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s 
alpha) for 18 countries is 0.765
(a) “sort glass or tins or plastic or 
newspaper and so on for recycling”
0.21 – 0.54 inter-item correlation (b) “buy fruit and vegetables grown without 
pesticides or chemicals”
range from 6 to 24 (c) “cut back on driving a car for 
environmental reasons”
(d) “reduce the energy or fuel you use at 
home for environmental reasons”
(e) “choose to save or re-use water for 
environmental reasons”
(f) “avoid buying certain products for 
environmental reasons”
SINGLE-ITEM INDICATORS ITEMS
Active Degrowth 
indicators 
10a “And how much do you agree or disagree 
with each of these statements?”c
“And how much do you agree or disagree 
with each of these statements?”
11a “how much do you agree or disagree with:”c
“Our country needs economic growth in 
order to protect the environment”
Passive Degrowth 
indicators 
 “how much do you agree or disagree with:”c
11b “Economic growth always harms the 
environment”
19c “Economic progress in [COUNTRY] 
will slow down unless we look after the 
environment better” 
a  Measured on Likert scale: 1 = “very willing”; 2 = “fairly willing”; 3 = “neither willing nor 
unwilling”; 4 = “fairly unwilling”; 5 = “strongly unwilling”
b  Measured on scale: 1 = “never”; 2 = “sometimes”; 3 = “mostly”, 4 = “always”
c  Measured on Likert-type scale: 1 = “strongly agree”; 2 = “agree”; 3 = “neither agree nor disa-
gree”; 4 = “disagree”; 5 = “strongly disagree”
Source: ISSP, 2010 – Environment III
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Independent variables
In order to explore socio-demographic characteristics of degrowth 
across Europe as independant variables we have used age and education. 
The educational level is a categorical variable with a distinction between 
no formal qualification, lowest formal qualification, secondary and tertiary 
educational attainment. Although Latouche emphasize redistribution as an 
inter-dependant degrowth principle and we added social trust to it, those 
measures in ISSP were not contextualized as part of sustainable and envi-
ronmental awareness, and therefore are used as independent variables. 
Generalized trust is constructed as additive index based on the answers to 
the statements: a) “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can 
be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”; b) “Gen-
erally speaking, do you think that most people would try to take advantage 
of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?4”. As a measure of 
redistribution orientation we have used the question 2b – “It is the respon-
sibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between 
people with high incomes and those with low incomes”. The answers were 
recoded from five points (from “strongly agree” to “disagree strongly”) to 
three points. 
Data Analytic Strategies
First we explored mean values and standard deviations of AMS and 
DCPEB for each of the 18 European countries along with percentages on 
each of the Active and Passive Degrowth indicators (table 2). The coun-
tries are ranked based on their GDP per capita (USD) data from 2011 (the 
same year as most of the countries were fielded with ISSP module Envi-
ronment). 
For the purpose of exploring the socio-demographic characteristics of 
degrowth supporters across Europe we conducted several logistic and OLS 
regression analyses. Predictors in the model are age and education as socio-
demographic elements, and indices of generalized trust and redistribution 
orientation. Correlates of AMS and DCPEB indexes were explored by linear 
regression analysis (table 3), while correlates of Active and Passive Degrowth 
indicators were analysed using logistic regression models (table 4 and 5). 
Scale on Active and Passive Degrowth indicators was dichotomized in a way 
that degrowth orientation was assigned with value 1 (strongly agreeing or 
strongly disagreeing with one of the four statements indicating degrowth 
4 Reliability analysis on these two items for all of the ISSP countries indicates an acceptable internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α is 0.75). Therefore, we have constructed an additive index ranging from 2 to 10.
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orientation), while non-degrowth orientation was assigned with value 0. 
Analysis was done on all European national populations as a single sample 
(individuals as unit of analysis).
Results 
Whilst national development policies are still expressed within nation 
states and socio-cultural determinants of each of the analysed states influ-
ence personal value-orientations, attitudes and behavioural patterns, the 
eco-social effect of degrowth requires a transnational activation (Chatterton 
& Pickerill, 2010). However, before looking into degrowth characteristics 
of European population as a whole (based on the 18 analysed countries), 
results of “degrowth indicators” are presented for each of the respective 
countries which are sorted according to national GDP per capita at the time 
of survey fielding (table 2).
Results presented in table 2 imply a significant variability among Euro-
pean countries in terms of degrowth prevalence and potential among pop-
ulations. Concerning material sacrifice or more precisely personal willing-
ness to make material sacrifice (give more money and accept reductions 
of material standard of living) in order to protect the environment, most of 
the analysed countries have a prevalence of unsustainably oriented popu-
lations. Furthermore, their average score on AMS index correlates strongly 
with national GDP per capita (Kendall’s tau_b:.774, p<.01). Transformation 
of material and social infrastructure into those more suitable to sustainabil-
ity will also require willing sacrifices on individual level, in terms of greater 
costs of living or taxes for maintenance of public environmental services 
(Wapner, 2010). It expresses not just willingness to sacrifice but also a striv-
ing or commitment to purposeful action. There is of course an important 
obstacle, similar to general ‘willingness to pay’ problems, to the use of this 
in comparative indications of different countries’ commitments to a com-
mon cause. Given the differences in affluence between countries, especially 
among our lower income countries, this might be more of a measure of 
‘ability to pay’ than ‘willingness’, and thus be more of an objective devel-
opment indicator than a measure of population’s willingness for different 
development strategies (Haanpää, 2006). Previous analyses comparing per-
ceptions of environmental risks with income and poverty risk in 18 Euro-
pean countries have confirmed this (Dolenec et al., 2014). 
Concerning degrowth-compliant pro-environmental behaviour there 
are differences between countries, and differences between the compo-
nents of the said index within individual countries also. For instance, in 
most of the countries sorting recyclables is by far the most frequent per-
sonal behaviour, while the least common effort is cutting back on driving 
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car for environmental reasons (more in Brajdić Vuković, 2014). But on this 
measure the correlation with GDP pc weakens (Kendall’s tau_b:.556, p<.01), 
calling for further analysis of social paradigms and material infrastructure 
for relevant behavioural practices. Personal degrowth-compliant behaviour 
can be perceived as a personal pro-environmental aspiration and therefore 
degrowth orientation, however it depends on the available infrastructure 
suitable for practicing degrowth-compliant behaviour. Based on the results 
from the composite measure, European population as a whole presents 
average level of degrowth-compliant behaviour. 
Active and passive degrowth indicators, on the other hand, are not indi-
ces of individuals’ personal values and behaviour, but are a collection of 
comments on the general societal development trends in the trade-offs 
between environmental conservation and economic activity. Moreover, 
differences in proportions within and between countries are visible, how-
ever in all countries “degrowth critique” of current economic model and its 
impact on the environment is present.
Although differences among countries suggest socio-structural and 
socio-cultural conditions which have an impact on dimensions of degrowth 
concept among respective populations, the concept itself transgress 
national boundaries and fundamental societal shifts it requires are not a task 
for individual states in the contemporary globalized society. It therefore 
makes sense to analyse all European national populations as a single ‘con-
tinental’ sample. It is thus interesting to see the characteristics of the overall 
population of European ISSP respondents concerning AMS and DCPEB and 
expressing support for the measures of Active or Passive Degrowth orienta-
tion. For that purpose, we have conducted a linear regression analysis for 
AMS and DCPEB, while for Active and Pasive degrowth indicators we have 
used logistic regression analysis (table 3). 
Concerning AMS predictors in the model education and trust are statisti-
cally significant in a way that those with higher educational attainment and 
those who have more trust in others express more willingness to make mate-
rial sacrifice in order to protect the environment. Similar is with degrowth-
compliant behaviour but with addition of age and redistribution orientation 
as also significant predictors. It seems that degrowth-compliant pro-envi-
ronmental behaviour is more prevalent as people became older and within 
those who are more supportive of governments’ redistributive role between 
citizens with high incomes and those with low incomes (tables 4, 5).
Active and Passive Degrowth orientation tend to differ in the age of 
the population, with younger population expressing support for Active 
Degrowth and older population for Passive Degrowth. Level of educa-
tional attainment, on the other hand, returns mixed results on support for 
Active and Passive Degrowth. Higher educational attainment is related with 
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expressions of disagreement that we worry too much about the future of the 
environment and not enough about current prices and jobs (variable 10a; 
part of Active Degrowth) and agreement with statement that country needs 
economic growth in order to protect the environment (variable 11a; part of 
Active Degrowth). Educational attainment is also a predictor of agreement 
with a statement that economic growth always harms the environment (vari-
able 11b; part of Passive Degrowth), but significance of educational strati-
fication is lower. On most our degrowth indicators individuals expressing 
degrowth-orientation are also individuals supporting redistributive role of 
the national governments. They are also those expressing higher levels of 
trust within a society, except on the indicator marking disagreement that 
their country needs to achieve economic growth in order to successfully 
protect the environment (variable 11a).
Conclusion 
The above analysis detects traces of the correlation between prosper-
ity and environmentally-motivated-degrowth explored in detail elsewhere 
(Dolenec, Domazet & Ančić, 2014; Domazet, Ančić et al., 2014). This correla-
tion is related to the prosperity thesis (Diekmann & Franzen, 1999), which 
claims that populations with higher average wealth express higher levels of 
environmental concern out of greater readiness to pay for environmental 
resilience as a scarce good. Such a thesis remains highly problematic for 
social transformation required for degrowth in the absence of the (seem-
ingly miraculous) wealth generation decoupled from local and global envi-
ronmental impact (Steinberger et al., 2013). National populations, and espe-
cially highly developed ones such as the European populations surveyed 
here are, must find democratic motivation for transformation of social 
practices in line with environmental sustainability, which will include some 
form of degrowth strategies (in the sense of degrowth broader than sim-
ple economistic reading, as outlined in the Introduction), even amongst the 
comparatively poorer populations, given that the growth space is severely 
limited from an ecological perspective. 
The idea to grow first, attain greater average wealth, and then deal with 
environmental issues later has been empirically delegitimised as a strategy 
(Simmons, 1993; Steinberger et al., 2013). In that sense the spread of national 
scores on measures of acceptance of material sacrifice (AMS), behavioural 
sacrifice of comfort (DCPEB) and Active Degrowth indicators is not encour-
aging. It shows wealthier countries’ populations lead the way in degrowth-
compliant orientation, but even those remain at levels insufficient for 
democratic mobilisation despite the history of highest material consump-
tion and environmental impact per capita in the world (Schaffartzik et al., 
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2014). Previous analyses have shown a reversal of the prosperity trend on 
awareness of ecological limits of growth within the sample of 18 European 
countries, as well as wider global ISSP sample (Domazet, Ančić et al., 2014; 
Domazet & Ančić, n.d.). Passive Degrowth indicators do not distinguish 
between wealthier and poorer European societies, showing that awareness 
of environmental limits of growth is not limited to national wealth, but the 
readiness to act on it is. 
As with the distinction between individual ‘willingness to pay’ and ‘abil-
ity to pay’ presented above, this may be another example of infrastructural 
Table 3:  ORDINARy lEAST SquARES REGRESSION ANAlySIS Of AMS AND 
DCPEB INDExES ACROSS 18 EuROPEAN COuNTRIES IN 2011.
Material sacrifice  
(AMS) index
Degrowth-compliant pro-
environmental behaviour 
(DCPEB)
Beta Coeff. Sig. Beta Coeff. Sig.
Age -.003 .642 .170 .000
Education .135 .000 .052 .000
Trust .225 .000 .079 .000
Redistribution orientation -.009 .170 .071 .000
F-ratio 450.318 179.722
F-Sig. .000 .000
R-squared .284 .206
Adjusted R-squared .080 .042
Number of countries 18 18
Number of observations 20573 16263
Source: ISSP, 2010 – Environment III
Table 4:  lOGISTIC REGRESSION Of ACTIVE DEGROwTh INDICATORS ACROSS 
18 EuROPEAN COuNTRIES IN 2011.
European 
Countries
Q10a Worry about future 
environment*
Q11a Environment: protect by 
economic growth*
β s.e. Wald Sig. Exp β ββ s.e. Wald Sig. Exp β
Age -,011 ,001 133,753 ,000 ,989 -,005 ,001 28,249 ,000 ,995
Education ,527 ,024 492,156 ,000 1,693 ,199 ,025 65,087 ,000 1,220
Trust ,166 ,008 456,354 ,000 1,181 ,106 ,008 172,645 ,000 1,112
Redistribution 
orientation ,214 ,022 93,200 ,000 ,807 -,032 ,022 2,055 ,152 ,969
Nagelkerke R2 ,129 ,030
Number of 
countries 18 18
Number of 
observations 16297 15666
*
 
Answers “4” and
 
“5” coded as 1, answers “1–3” coded as 0. 
Source: ISSP, 2010 – Environment III
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insufficiencies, in this case socio-economic rather than material, for 
degrowth-compliant strategies among poorer European populations. Even 
on normative grounds, it can be considered unfair to expect those with less 
resources in contemporary globalised economy to lead the contribution to 
the common endeavour, or as Shue says “if the wealthy have no general 
obligation to help the poor, the poor certainly have not general obligation 
to help the wealthy” (Shue, 1999: 543). But as the degrowth movement, 
introduced above, is trans-national, so the environmental constrictions and 
strategies required to address them are. National populations are political 
subjects in contemporary Europe, but a global transition along the lines of 
degrowth movements’ invocations requires a transnational mobilisation, 
especially in a wealthy and highly interconnected region such as Europe is. 
In this sense we aimed to examine the overall European degrowth-oriented 
population as a democratic actor in its own right. 
Our results indicate that there is a significant difference between Active 
Degrowth and Passive Degrowth supporting populations within the overall 
European sample, on top of and in combination with the differences exhib-
ited by national populations.5 Whilst ‘European degrowth supporters’ are 
5 whilst the collection of individual respondents reported on here is not a representative sample of the 
overall European population, but a collection of different size representative samples of national popula-
tions of 18 participating countries, based on previous and above analyses there is no reason to assume that 
nationality influences the profile of degrowth-orientation individuals. More explicitly there is no reason 
to assume as a starting hypothesis that odds of age group or redistribution orientation are affected by 
the values of the degrowth-compliant answers to Active and Passive Degrowth variables (predictors) and 
nationality of the respondent. Nonetheless, these results should be used as first indication of trends among 
European population to be followed by further analysis on a representative European sample scaling the 
national participation in accordance with the distribution of national population sizes in Europe. 
Table 5:  lOGISTIC REGRESSION Of PASSIVE DEGROwTh INDICATORS ACROSS 
18 EuROPEAN COuNTRIES IN 2011.
European 
Countries
Q11b Economic growth: harms 
the environment**
Q19c Economic progress in 
[COUNTRY] will slow down**
ββ s.e. Wald Sig. Exp β ββ s.e. Wald Sig. Exp β
Age ,004 ,001 18,531 ,000 1,004 ,008 ,001 56,246 ,000 1,008
Education -,238 ,024 94,732 ,000 ,788 -,059 ,026 5,047 ,025 ,943
Trust -,109 ,008 179,631 ,000 ,897 ,013 ,009 2,177 ,140 1,013
Redistribution 
orientation ,321 ,024 181,345 ,000 1,379 ,337 ,024 202,167 ,000 1,400
Nagelkerke R2 ,059 ,030
Number of 
countries 18 18
Number of 
observations 14533 13044
**Answers “1” and “2” coded as 1, answers “3–5” coded as 0. 
Source: ISSP, 2010 – Environment III
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invariably those already expressing individual concern for the environment 
and individually committed to material sacrifice, they are also people who sup-
port the redistributive role of the government and tend to have greater level 
of social trust. Educational attainment also plays a part in degrowth-support 
according to our measures, but its role is much less clear and requires further 
analysis and elucidation. This is not unexpected given the theoretical expecta-
tions of the social degrowth transition, including greater social cohesion and 
redistribution of outputs of production in lieu of shifts in social metabolism. 
What is clear, though, is the age difference, with younger ‘European 
degrowthers’ being more supportive of the Active Degrowth measures and 
older ‘European degrowthers’ more supportive of the Passive Degrowth 
measures. Interestingly, this ‘passive’ awareness of normative environmen-
tal limits of economic growth, combines with self-reporting of individual 
sacrificial behaviour, as degrowth-compliant pro-environmental behaviour 
is also more prevalent as people became older. This need not be surpris-
ing, as we might be seeing an influence of aspiration-dampening (some 
might say wisdom) with age, a certain transformational defeatism along 
the lines of more-conservative-as-you-age. There is also a hang-up of the 
twentieth-century ecological modernisation approach at play here, affecting 
older more than younger populations (Cifrić, Čaldarović, Kalanj & Kufrin, 
1998). As the Active and Passive Degrowth statements test the overall soci-
etal strategies and not personal ‘devil-may-care’ attitudes the age-dependent 
difference should not be ascribed to the different life-prospects of the age 
groups. A natural follow-up to these indicative findings would be testing 
the relationship between contextual socio-demographic characteristics of 
degrowth supporters across Europe and viable and positive degrowth-ori-
ented mid-term policies and long-term development strategies on a repre-
sentative sample of entire European population. It would also be interesting 
to see whether there is overlap in these characteristics and support between 
European and global populations, especially those already expressing high 
proportion of support for some of our degrowth-orientation measures. 
What is clear is that on the whole the European degrowth-compliant pop-
ulation motivated from environmental perspective is neither negligent nor 
of irrelevant size, whilst still presenting a minority in both ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ 
European states. It is a population of individuals with value-sets overlapping 
with Latouche’s (2009) R’s, in for example calls for redistribution, commu-
nity cohesion and localisation through social trust. It is also a population 
with marked willingness to commit individual sacrifices from the perspec-
tive of material self-interest, and crucially its younger segment is more dedi-
cated to possible proactive measures than the older one is. And whilst there 
is no difference between citizens of ‘richer’ and ‘poorer’ European states 
in the awareness of environmental limits of growth, with generally ‘older 
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environmentalist degrowthers’ opting for this normative approach, wealth 
and economic output of individual states is a reliable predictor of their 
overall population’s willingness to support proactive degrowth transforma-
tion, practice pro-environmental behaviour and commit to individual mate-
rial sacrifice. This would indicate a possible cleavage between ‘richer’ and 
‘poorer’ Europeans in aspirational choice between technologically induced 
‘green economy’ and socially induced degrowth, which calls for a better tar-
geted and more nuanced comparative research than the survey employed 
here permitted. Its findings could help inform the widening and deepening 
trans-national pan-European process of democratization, aiming at eventual 
social emancipation for a just degrowth scenario implementation. 
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